Private Military Contractors

Blackwater: America's Most Notorious Mercenary Army

Blackwater USA was founded in 1997 by Erik Prince, a former Navy SEAL and heir to a billion-dollar auto parts fortune. His sister, Betsy DeVos, later became Trump's Secretary of Education. Prince was a major Republican donor with deep connections to the religious right and the intelligence community.

Before 9/11, Blackwater was a small training facility in the North Carolina swamps. By 2007, it had over 2,300 personnel deployed in Iraq and had received more than $1.6 billion in government contracts. Its guards provided personal security for State Department officials, including Ambassador Paul Bremer — the man who ran Iraq's occupation.

Blackwater operated with near-total impunity. Its contracts included provisions that made it immune from Iraqi law under CPA Order 17, signed by Bremer in 2004. The order granted all contractors immunity from Iraqi legal proceedings — meaning they could kill Iraqi civilians without any possibility of prosecution in Iraqi courts. This immunity was maintained until 2009.

After Nisour Square, Blackwater rebranded — first to Xe Services (2009), then to Academi (2011), then merged into Constellis Group (2014). Erik Prince sold his stake but continued to operate in the private military space, proposing to privatize the Afghanistan war entirely and building a private air force in the UAE. He later recruited a private spy network for the Trump administration and has been linked to mercenary operations in Libya, China, and Myanmar.

Nisour Square: September 16, 2007

On a hot September afternoon in Baghdad, a Blackwater convoy of four armored vehicles entered Nisour Square, a busy traffic circle. What happened next is among the worst civilian massacres of the Iraq War — and it was committed not by soldiers but by private contractors operating under a State Department contract.

Among the dead: Ahmed Haithem Ahmed Al Rubia'iy, a medical student driving his mother to a doctor's appointment. His car was the first hit. His mother burned alive in the vehicle as Blackwater guards continued firing. Ali Kinani, 9 years old, was shot in the head while sitting in the backseat of his father's car. His father, who survived, spent years fighting for justice.

An FBI investigation found no evidence of hostile fire. Blackwater's initial claim — that the convoy was ambushed — was contradicted by every witness, by forensic evidence, and by the accounts of other Blackwater guards who were horrified by what they saw. Four guards were eventually convicted: one of first-degree murder, three of voluntary manslaughter. They received sentences of 12–30 years.

On December 22, 2020, President Trump pardoned all four. Nicholas Slatten, convicted of first-degree murder of Ahmed Al Rubia'iy, walked free. The Iraqi government called the pardons a “slap in the face.” Ali Kinani's father said: “My son's blood is not worth less than the blood of any American.”

DynCorp: Trafficking, Pedophilia & Continued Contracts

In 1999, DynCorp employees working as peacekeepers in Bosnia were found to be involved in a sex trafficking ring — purchasing women and girls, some as young as 12, from criminal networks. The women were held in brothels, their passports confiscated, and sold between DynCorp employees.

Whistleblower Ben Johnston, a DynCorp aircraft mechanic, reported the trafficking to the Army Criminal Investigation Command. DynCorp's response was to fire Johnston. When he sued under the False Claims Act, the case was settled. The employees involved were quietly sent home. None were criminally prosecuted — the military claimed jurisdictional issues, and Bosnia lacked the capacity to pursue charges.

In 2009, a leaked diplomatic cable revealed that DynCorp employees in Afghanistan had hired bacha bazi — “dancing boys,” a euphemism for child sex workers in Afghan culture. The practice involves boys, often as young as 11, who are dressed as women, forced to dance, and sexually abused. The US Embassy's response, per the cable, was concern about “ichiban media attention” rather than criminal investigation.

DynCorp's punishment: nothing. The company continued to receive billions in government contracts. As of 2025, its successor entity still holds active Defense Department contracts. The message is clear: no scandal, no crime, no atrocity will cost you your contract if you are essential to the war machine.

8,000 Dead — and Nobody Counted Them

Over 8,000 contractors died in Iraq and Afghanistan between 2001 and 2020. Their deaths were not included in the official US casualty count. Their names do not appear on war memorials. When politicians cited the cost of war, they mentioned 7,000 military deaths — not the additional 8,000 contractor deaths.

Many of the dead were not Americans. The private military industry relies heavily on third-country nationals (TCNs) — workers from Uganda, Nepal, the Philippines, Fiji, and other developing countries hired at a fraction of what American or British contractors earn. A Filipino cook at a US base in Iraq might earn $500/month — compared to $15,000/month for an American in the same compound. When these workers die, their families receive minimal compensation under the Defense Base Act, often after years of legal battles.

In 2011, a 60-truck KBR convoy in Afghanistan was hit by an IED that killed three TCN truck drivers. Their names were never released publicly. The convoy was carrying food to a US base. The military recorded zero casualties that day.

A Pattern of Crimes Without Consequences

Erik Prince: The Revolving Door in Human Form

Erik Prince embodies the post-9/11 mercenary entrepreneur. After selling Blackwater, he didn't retire — he expanded. His post-Blackwater career reads like a geopolitical thriller:

Prince's career demonstrates that private military contracting is not an industry — it's an ideology. The belief that war is too important to be left to governments. That profit and combat are natural partners. That accountability is an obstacle to be engineered around. Prince has faced congressional investigations, UN probes, and DOJ scrutiny. He has never been charged with a crime. He remains wealthy, connected, and influential.

The Legal Black Hole: Who Holds Contractors Accountable?

The genius — and the horror — of military privatization is the accountability gap. Contractors in Iraq operated in a legal no-man's-land:

The result is functional impunity. Of the thousands of incidents involving private contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan — shootings, beatings, sexual assaults, trafficking, negligent homicide — fewer than a dozen resulted in criminal prosecution. The message sent to contractors was clear: you will not be held accountable. And so they weren't.

The Future: Private War Is Here to Stay

The private military industry is not shrinking — it's evolving. The global private military and security market is estimated at $250 billion and growing. Russia's Wagner Group demonstrated in Ukraine, Syria, Libya, and Africa that the mercenary model is now global. China is building private security companies for Belt and Road projects. The UAE has become a hub for mercenary recruitment.

For the US government, contractors offer an irresistible proposition: they fight wars without triggering the political costs of military casualties. When a soldier dies, it's front-page news and a congressional hearing. When a contractor dies, it's a line in a Labor Department database that nobody reads. Contractors allow presidents to wage wars that would be politically impossible with an all-volunteer military — and certainly impossible with a draft.

This is the fundamental corruption: the privatization of war removes the democratic check on war. If the public doesn't see the casualties, doesn't know the cost, and doesn't vote on the deployment, then war becomes a business decision — not a political one. And business decisions are made by people who profit from the answer being yes.

Sources

• • Congressional Research Service, “Department of Defense Contractor and Troop Levels in Afghanistan and Iraq”
• • CENTCOM Quarterly Contractor Census Reports (2008–2024)
• • Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) Reports
• • Department of Labor, Defense Base Act Case Summary Reports
• • Scahill, Jeremy. “Blackwater: The Rise of the World's Most Powerful Mercenary Army”
• • ProPublica, “Disposable Army: Civilian Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan”
• • FBI Investigation of the September 16, 2007 Nisour Square Shooting
• • UN Panel of Experts on Libya, Reports on Erik Prince (2020–2021)
• • Amnesty International, “Left in the Dark: Failures of Accountability for Civilian Casualties”
• • Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, Final Report (2011)